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Political connections, founder-managers, and their impacts on 
tunneling in China’s listed firms 
 
Abstract:  
We investigate the impacts of manager’s political connections and founder status on 
tunneling using a sample of China’s listed firms from 2004 to 2010. We find that the impacts 
and the interactive impact of manager’s political connections and founder status on firms’ 
tunneling behaviors are related to firms’ ownership types. More specifically, managers’ 
political connections increase tunneling for the local SOEs firms that the state ownerships are 
not large enough for effective control, while managers’ political connections reduce tunneling 
for the central SOEs firms. Funder-managers resisting tunneling behavior can be observed 
across all types of ownership firms, although it is more significant at private and central 
SOEs firms. When the political connected managers are also firms founders, the negative 
impact on tunneling is stronger at central SOEs firms. We also find that although newly 
promulgated criminal laws and regulations have reduced the market-wide severity of 
tunneling, they are less effective for SOEs and firms with politically connected managers. We 
further examine the differences between official-type political connections and CPC/CPPCC-
type political connection, and the differences between a chairman’s political connection and a 
CEO’s political connection, with regard to their impacts on tunneling. 
 
JEL classification: G32, G34, G38, K22 
Keywords: tunneling, political connection, founder manager, regulation, corporate 
governance 
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1 Introduction 
 
Well-dispersed ownership is rare outside the US and Japan, while most companies in 
Europe and Asia are controlled by large blockholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer 1999, 2000; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 2000; Faccio and Lang 2002). The 
conflict of interest between large shareholders and minority shareholders that arises from 
such a concentrated ownership structure has been the focus of research into corporate 
governance in recent years. Controlling shareholders and other insiders (e.g., managers) have 
strong incentives and the capabilities to extract private benefits from listed firms and 
expropriate minority shareholders. This expropriating behavior is commonly referred to as 
“tunneling” (Johnson, La Porta, Shleifer, and Lopez-de-Silanes 2000) or “self-dealings” 
(Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008). 
The nature and scope of tunneling depends on the legal and regulatory protection of 
minority shareholders and financial market development that exists in a country (Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008). Due to the unique process of privatization, the 
lack of effective external governance mechanisms and weak investor protection, publicly 
listed firms in China are frequently subject to expropriation by controlling shareholders and 
other insiders. Researchers have documented various forms of tunneling in Chinese markets, 
such as seasoned equity offerings (Aharony, Lee, and Wong 2000), cash dividends (Deng, 
Gan, and He 2006), transfer pricing (Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis 2006; Peng, Wei, and Yang 
2011), loan guarantees to related parties (Berkman, Cole, and Fu 2009) and inter-corporate 
loans (Jiang, Lee, and Yue 2010), to give some samples. 
Existing studies on tunneling practices in China have so far largely focused on their 
effect on firm valuation and performance (Li, Wang, and Sun 2004; Cheung, Rau, and 
Stouraitis 2006; Berkman, Cole, and Fu 2009; Jiang, Lee, and Yue 2010). While some other 
studies examined the determinant factors of such tunneling behaviors, they concentrated 
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mainly on ownership structures and firm characteristics (Bai, Liu, Lu, Song, and Zhang 2004; 
Deng, Gan, and He 2006; Gao and Kling 2008; Jian and Wong 2010; Peng, Wei, and Yang 
2011); very little attention has been paid to the relationship between tunneling and 
managerial attributes. To fill this gap, we use a sample of China’s listed firms from 2004 to 
2010 to investigate the relationship between a firm’s tunneling behavior and manager’s 
political connection and founder status.  
Due to a weak institutional environment and highly concentrated ownership structure, 
the Chinese stock market is conducive to tunneling. Thus, in this paper, we focus on a 
particular form of tunneling — fund occupations by the largest shareholder and other insiders. 
Fund occupation is a widespread tunneling practice in China that has been repeatedly targeted 
by the China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC). In an unprecedented prevision of 
punishment, senior executives of listed firms will hold criminal responsibility if they cause 
substantial loss to the firm by helping to facilitate or failing to prevent such fund 
occupations.1
Our results show that, from 2004 to 2010, about 34% of the sample firms reported 
fund occupation by the largest shareholder and other insiders. The funds lent to largest 
shareholder and insiders were at low or no interest charge, and a large proportion of these 
funds were occupied for a long periods, even never paid back to the firm (Jiang, Lee, and Yue 
2010). 
 But this problem still remains high because the enforcement is weak in real 
practice. 
We find that both political connection and the founder status of managers definitely 
affect the severity of tunneling through fund occupations. We also show that the impact of 
political connection and founder status on tunneling depends on a firm’s ownership types, 
that is the identity of the largest ultimate shareholder. We further demonstrate that the 
                                                          
1 See Article 169, Amendment Six to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, effective of June 29, 
2006. 
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relationship between a manager’s political connection and tunneling depends on whether the 
largest ultimate shareholder has effective control of the firm. Specifically, we find that 
politically connected managers at local SOEs significantly increase the severity of tunneling 
by the largest shareholder and other insiders, whereas politically connected managers at 
central SOEs reduce tunneling. Such a relationship exists only when the largest shareholder 
(i.e., different levels of governments) has no effective control of the firm. Across all three 
ownership types, there is less tunneling in firms with founder-managers than firms with non-
founder managers, but the impact of the interaction between political connection and founder 
status differs among firms with various ownership types.  
We then examine the effectiveness of CSRC regulations and law enhancement, by 
dividing our full sample into two periodic sub-samples, and find that while the overall 
severity of tunneling has declined across all firms of three ownership types, the percentage of 
decline was smaller at SOEs and firms with politically connected managers. This suggests 
that related regulations and laws have had less effect on these firms. Indeed, they have been 
least effective in local SOEs with politically connected managers. 
Finally, we test whether there is any difference between a Chairman’s political 
connection and a CEO’s political connection, in terms of their impact on tunneling. We find 
that for both private firms and local SOEs, a politically connected Chairman is more 
influential than a politically connected CEO with regard to tunneling, but for central SOEs, 
neither the Chairman nor the CEO alone determines the relationship between political 
connection and tunneling. 
Our study develops the existing literatures in several ways. First, we identify a 
channel through which political connected managers tunnel firms’ assets. . Existing literature 
has illustrated several effects of political connection such as preferential access to financing 
(Khwaja and Mian 2005; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006), lower equity costs (Boubakri, 
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Guedhami, Mishra, and Saffar 2010), a higher probability of government bailouts (Faccio, 
Masulis, and McConnell 2006), less regulation and more favorable treatment in the legal 
system (Li, Meng, and Zhang 2006), as well as lower CEO pay-performance sensitivity (You 
and Du 2012), and less effective boards (Fan, Wong, and Zhang 2007). We find that 
tunneling through fund occupations is another important channel through which political 
connection affects a firm’s behavior, and in turn its valuation and performance.  
Our paper complements two other related studies. Chang and Wong (2004) find that 
party control restrains the largest shareholders from expropriation at SOEs. Peng, Wei, and 
Yang (2011) find that political connection is negatively associated with the announcement 
effect of related party transactions (RPTs), suggesting that politically connected firms are 
more likely to conduct tunneling-motivated RPTs. We show that the impact of political 
connection on tunneling really depends on the firm’s ownership types. To this extent, our 
paper is also closely related to Wu, Wu, and Rui (2010), who find that the impact of political 
connection on firm performance, government subsidiary, and policy burden is subject to firm 
ownership.  
Second, our paper develops the exisitngliterature on investor protection and relevant 
law enforcement in China. Authorities in China have made a substantial effort to introduce 
laws and regulations that will improve corporate governance and investor protection 
(MacNeil 2002). However, the lack of an independent judiciary and effective court system 
means that enforcement of these laws and regulations remains weak (Pei 2001; Allen, Qian, 
and Qian 2005). Levine (1998) finds that both legal codes and rigorous enforcement of laws 
and contracts are crucially important to maintain a smoothly functioning banking system and 
encourage long-term economic growth. Pistor, Martin, and Gelfer (2000) examine a sample 
of 19 transition economies and find that the effectiveness of laws is even more important than 
the completeness of written laws for a country’s economic growth. We find that political 
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connection is an important factor that affects the effectiveness of laws and regulations to 
protect investors. To this extent, our study is closely related to Berkman, Cole, and Fu (2010), 
who examine the reaction of stock market to the introduction of three regulations designed to 
improve minority shareholder protection, and find that firms with strong ties to government 
do not benefit from the regulations. Our study provides similar evidence but from a more 
direct perspective. 
Third, our study develops the existing literature on founder-managers. The behavior 
of founder-managers and their impacts on firm valuation and performance have attracted 
great academic interest. Both positive and negative evidence has been presented in existing 
literature (for example: Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira,2005 and 
2009; Villalonga and Amit,2006; Leone and Liu, 2008; Anderson, Duru, and Reeb, 2009 and 
Fahlenbrach,2009). China’s stock market is still in its early stage of development and the 
number of listed firms is fast growing, suggesting there is a higher percentage of firms with 
founder-managers than in Western markets. 2
Finally, we find that the largest shareholders’ tunneling behavior (and the impact of 
political connection on tunneling) differs whether or not they have effective control of the 
 Yet there are only a few studies that have 
directly examined the impact of founder-managers on the Chinese market (e.g., Wang and 
Wang 2011; Zhang, Ji, Tao, and Wang 2011). These two papers examine the relationship 
between founders and venture-capital performance, and the relationship between a CEO’s 
founder status and turnover. We study the impact of founder-managers from a different 
perspective so our paper helps to give a better understanding of the impact of founder-
managers in China and provides an important complement to the literature that focuses on 
Western markets.  
                                                          
2 More than 21% of all our sample firms have founder-managers, with the percentage of 33% for private firms 
and 15% for SOEs, respectively. This almost doubles the ratio in the US, where only about 11% of firms have 
founder-managers.  
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firm. Most of the existing literature simply regards the largest shareholder as the controlling 
shareholder (e.g., Chen, Firth, Xin, and Xu 2008; Wu, Wu, and Rui 2010). Our results, 
however, show that the largest shareholder does not always effectively control the firm. 
About 18% of private firms and 9% of SOEs in our sample have their largest shareholders 
controlling less than 20% of the firms, a threshold we consider appropriate for effective 
control. Our paper therefore may shed some new light on the behavior of firms in China. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of 
existing literature. Section 3 presents the institutional background in China and lays out our 
hypotheses. Section 4 introduces the samples and data. Section 5 reports our empirical 
results, and Section 6 concludes our paper. 
2 Literature review 
 
2.1 Tunneling and largest shareholders 
 
A large number of papers have studied the relationship between a firm’s ownership 
structure and the level of tunneling by the largest shareholder. Berkman, Cole, and Fu (2009) 
and Jiang, Lee, and Yue (2010) find that the severity of expropriation through loan guarantee 
issuance and related lending is greater for private firms. Chen, Firth, and Xu (2009) and 
Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis (2010) both find that firms controlled by the central government 
are more likely to be propped up, while firms controlled by local government are more likely 
to be expropriated. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), Claessens, Djankov, and 
Lang (2000) and  Faccio and Lang (2002) provide empirical evidence showing that firms 
belonging to business groups and being controlled by the ultimate owner through a chain of 
companies are more likely to be tunneled.  The ultimate controlling shareholder exerts control 
over lower-level firms without necessarily having a majority of cash flow rights, which 
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separates control rights from cash flow rights. This gives the controlling shareholder a strong 
incentive to extract private benefits and expropriate minority shareholders. Bertrand, Mehta, 
and Mullainathan (2002) and Jian and Wong (2010) provide further empirical evidence that 
supports this finding. 
 
2.2 Literature on political connections 
 
A rapidly growing body of literature examines the impact of political connection on 
firm behavior, valuation, and performance. On the positive side, Khwaja and Mian (2005) 
and Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) find that politically connected firms have preferential 
access to loans from state-owned banks. Li, Meng, and Zhang (2006) and Li, Meng, Wang, 
and Zhou (2008) find that political connection gives a firm favourable regulatory and legal 
treatment. Mobarak and Purbasari (2006) estimate that being politically connected triples the 
likelihood of receiving valuable import licenses in Indonesia. Boubakri, Guedhami, Mishra, 
and Saffar (2010) find that politically connected firms enjoy a lower cost of equity capital 
than their non-connected peer because investors consider them to be less risky. Faccio, 
Masulis, and McConnell (2006) find that politically connected firms are significantly more 
likely to be bailed out by governments. Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) and Faccio and 
Parsley (2009) indirectly demonstrate the positive effect of political connection by showing 
that politically connected firms decrease in value when they lose their connections. 
On the negative side, Cheung, Jing, Rau, and Stouraitis (2005) find that political 
connection worsens the expropriation of minority shareholders and is detrimental to the firm. 
Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) find that there are more bureaucrats and fewer professionals on 
the boards of politically connected firms. You and Du (2012) find that political connection 
weakens CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) and Faccio (2010) 
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use Chinese and cross-country data respectively and show that politically connected firms 
underperform their non-connected peers both in both the short-term and long-run. 
In this paper, we study the impact of political connection from a different perspective 
and provide new evidence on how political connection affects firm behavior which in turn 
affects firm valuation and performance. 
2.3 Literature on founder-managers 
 
Researchers have paid a lot of attention to the effects that founder-managers have on 
firm behavior and performance and thus far have presented mixed evidence. Anderson and 
Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006), and Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2009) all find 
that founder-manager firms have a higher market value and better performance than non-
founder-manager firms. Fahlenbrach (2009) finds that founder-CEO firms invest more on 
R&D, have a higher capital expenditure and make more focused M&A. Li and Srinivasan 
(2011) find that CEO pay-performance sensitivity is higher and the level of pay is lower 
when there is a founder-director on the board. In contrast, Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan, and 
Newman (1985) find that stock markets react positively when a company founder suddenly 
dies, which suggests that founder control has a negative effect. Leon and Liu (2008) find that, 
in comparison to non-founder-CEOs, founder-CEOs are significantly less likely to be fired 
following accounting irregularity, which indicates that they are entrenched. Anderson, Duru, 
and Reeb (2009) find that both founder- and heir-firms are significantly more opaque than 
firms with diffuse shareholders, and founders and heirs tend to exploit this opacity to 
expropriate minority shareholders. 
Firms with founder-managers account for about 11% of the largest public firms in the 
US, which is considered to have the most widely dispersed ownership. However, firms with 
founder-managers make up more than one fifth of all the firms in our sample, and yet they 
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have not attracted very much attention. He, Wang, Mei, and Lian (2010) find that a founder-
manager’s turnover has a significant and immediate negative effect on firm performance. Pi 
and Lowe (2010) study the patterns of CEO turnovers from 1997 to 2006 and find that being 
a founder makes a CEO less likely to be replaced involuntarily. Wang and Wang (2011) find 
that a cross-border venture-capital firm’s performance is strongly related to the founder’s 
departure. They argue that the departure of the founder indicates the firm’s transition to a 
modern corporation.  
Existing literature on founder-managers for the Chinese market has so far focused on 
its effects on firm valuation and performance, but very little is understood about the 
mechanism of such effects. Our paper attempts to fill this gap by studying the effect a 
founder-manager has on a firm’s tunneling behavior and its joint effect with political 
connection. 
3 Institutional background and hypotheses 
 
3.1 Unique features that make the Chinese stock market conducive to 
tunneling 
 
China started its economic reform in the late 1970’s, but more than a decade of 
gradual reform has done little to revitalize state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In fact, their 
overall performance deteriorated significantly. In the early 1990’s about 40% of SOEs were 
losing money and by 1994 almost half of them had zero or negative equities (Deng, Gan, and 
He 2006). This was even more striking considering the fact that most SOEs were profitable 
when the reform first started. As a result of this, Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange were set up as part of government initiatives to recapitalize and partially 
privatize SOEs, alongside with the share issue privatization (SIP) reform. 
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However, in transiting itself from a highly centralized planned economy to a modern 
market-oriented economy, China has been unable to synchronize other necessary and 
complementary reforms such as property rights, investor protection, and corporate laws. For 
the following reasons, the Chinese stock market offers a natural setting to study tunneling 
activities by large shareholders and other insiders. 
First, in the pre-IPO restructure of SOEs, only about a quarter of all SOEs have gone 
through a complete restructure. Most were only partially restructured when part of the firm 
was either carved-out or spun-off to become publicly listed firms where the parent companies 
owned the majority of shares in the listed firms and also served as the controlling 
shareholders.  And the listed firm and its controlling shareholder maintain a close relationship 
in terms of production and services. Deng, Gan, and He (2006) argue that such a parent-
subsidiary structure provides insiders with strong incentives and the capabilities to engage in 
tunneling activities.3
                                                          
3 Bae et al. (2002) and Bertrand et al. (2002) find similar evidence that compared firms not belonging to a 
business group, firms belonging to business groups are more prone to tunneling, using data in South Korea and 
India, respectively.  
  Second, external corporate governance mechanism is weak in China 
which means that takeovers and other forms of competition for corporate ownership (e.g., 
proxy contest) are far from common. Other forms of non-market monitoring forces, such as 
the media, play a significant role in improving corporate governance in Western markets 
(e.g., Miller 2006; Dyck, Morse, and Zingales 2010), but in China, the media is still tightly 
controlled by the government and therefore hasn’t become an effective external monitor. 
Third, China’s lack of a well-developed legal and investor protection system means that 
minority shareholders have few channels through which to take action against controlling 
shareholders when their rights are jeopardized (McNeil 2002; Allen, Qian and Qian 2005). 
Fourth, the China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) is the official regulator of 
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Chinese stock markets, but its lack of investigative and prosecuting power and minimum 
amount of resources ultimately results in a weak enforcement of its own rules. 
To sum up, this unique and salient institutional environment makes the Chinese stock 
market conducive to frequent tunneling by large shareholders and other insiders. 
3.2 Hypotheses development 
 
3.2.1 Impact of manager’s political connection on tunneling 
 
After realizing that centralized economic decision making mechanism was actually 
hampering the early stages of economic reform, the central Chinese government gradually 
decentralized economic decision making by delegating decision right at a contain level to 
local governments. The decentralization also includes that attributed some SOEs to local 
government for administration, and separation of local state tax bureau system and central 
state bureau system.  During the SIP reform, the most profitable business units at SOEs were 
often carved out and listed on the stock market, with the government retaining the largest 
stake in these now publicly listed SOEs.4
Due to the two levels administrated SOEs, this partial privatization therefore created 
two types of listed SOEs, commonly referred to as local SOEs (where different levels of local 
government are the largest shareholders) and central SOEs (where the central government is 
the largest shareholder). It has been well documented that local governments and the central 
government have divergent interests (Bai, Li, Tao, and Wang 2000; Bai, Lu, and Tao 2005). 
As part of the decentralization, local governments also assumed the legacies of a planned 
economy such as the heavy social and political burdens of maintaining surplus labor and 
providing social welfare (Qian 1996). The political responsibility of local government 
 
                                                          
4 Of course in some cases, the government may choose to relinquish its stake by selling it to private entities, 
resulting in “private control transfer”. However, as Chen, Firth, Xin, and Xu (2008) find, there are only 62 such 
private control transfers from 1996 to 2000. 
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officials is often closely related to the social stability of their governed regions. Cheung, Rau, 
and Stouraitis (2010) find that expropriation is prevailing in areas where government 
bureaucrats are less likely to be prosecuted for misappropriating state funds, suggesting that 
local governments can offer SOEs under their control certain administrative protection 
against unfavorable court rulings. As a result, local governments have strong incentives to 
extract resources from these firms in order to fulfill the political and personal interests of 
government officials. 
To facilitate tunneling, local governments have a strong incentive to appoint  
politically connected manages to local SOEs, who in turn, being more  concerned about their 
political careers, 5
H 1a: For local SOEs, manager’s political connection is positively related to tunneling. 
 are often willing to collude with local governments to engage in tunneling 
activities.  Therefore, we propose that: 
 In contrast to local SOEs, most central SOEs are very large firms with strategic 
importance for national security and economic growth. Central SOEs have much lighter 
policy burdens than local SOEs (Wu, Wu, and Rui 2010), so the central government wants to 
ensure their financial success for economic, national security, or public image reasons. It 
therefore appoints politically connected managers mainly to ensure full operational control of 
these central SOEs, although these politically connected managers are not under the same 
pressure from as their peers at local SOEs. 
 The relationship between manager’s monetary compensation and firm performance, 
although generally found to be positive (Mengistae and Xu 2004; Firth, Fung, and Rui 2007), 
is nonetheless weak (Firth, Fung, and Rui 2006).  In this concern, non-politically connected 
managers at central SOEs, who are not concerned about their political careers, may have 
                                                          
5 In a year 2000 survey cited by Chang and Wong (2004), local party committees and governments have 
remained involved in all major corporate decision in listed local SOEs, particularly personnel decisions.   
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some incentive to extract private benefits through tunneling. In contrast, a politically 
connected manager has another implicit incentive – political promotion, which can be a 
substitute for weak monetary compensation (Cao, Lemmon, Pan, Qian, and Tian 2011). 6And 
the probability of political promotion is positively related to firm performance (Li and Zhou 
2005). Therefore, politically connected managers at central SOEs would be vitally interested 
in having the firms perform well, and it would reduce his incentive to engage in tunneling. 7
H 1b: For central SOEs, manager’s political connection is negatively related to tunneling. 
 
We expect that: 
3.2.2 Different impacts on tunneling between two types of political connections 
  In China, a manager’s political connection can be categorized into two broad 
types. It’s necessary to distinguish the impacts of these two types of political connections, 
due to their different natures. The first type of political connection is established when a 
listed firm appoints a manager who is a current or former government official or military 
officer. For private firms, these politically connected mangers, through their personal network 
with current government authorities (or guanxi), bring the firms many benefits, such as fiscal 
grants, licenses, government procurements, bank loans, and other highly sought-after 
resources. In doing so, these managers have strong incentives to seize some private benefits 
as rewards for the benefits they bring to the firms. For SOEs, managers who were or  still are 
government officials usually keep their official position rankings. Their business and political 
career largely depend on how well they carry out policies and instructions of the relevant 
local or central government (the largest ultimate shareholder of SOEs).  Combining it with 
our earlier analysis, we therefore expect: 
                                                          
6 For example, Mr. Wei Liucheng, the then Chairman of China National Offshore Oil Corp., was promoted to 
the position of deputy Secretary of Hainan provisional Party committee in September 2003. 
7 It’s true that politically connected managers at local SOEs are also interested in good firm performance, but 
they face high pressure from local government to help tunnel. Compared with their peers at central SOEs, 
managers at local SOEs are more likely to be protected from prosecution by local government. Furthermore, 
the potential (political career) cost of not being promoted is higher for a central-SOE manager than a local-SOE 
manager.  
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H 1.1a Manager’s government-official-type political connection is positively related to 
tunneling at private firms and local SOEs, but negatively related to tunneling at central SOEs. 
 The second type of political connection arises when a manager becomes a member of 
the Chinese People’s Congress (CPC) or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC). For political reasons, the Communist Party generally requires that 
members of the CPC and CPPCC have relatively good images. To maintain such a good 
image, a manager who is a member of the CPC /CPPCC is less likely to engage in tunneling, 
than a manager who isn’t a CPC/CPPCC member. Therefore, we propose that: 
H 1.1b Manager’s CPC/CPPCC-type political connection is negatively related to tunneling at 
both private firms and SOEs. 
3.2.3 Effectiveness of laws and regulations enforcement across firms 
 
 On October 19, 2005, the State Council of China issued a “Notice on Improving the 
Quality of Listed Firms” put forward by the CSRC. It explicitly reuqired that controlling 
shareholders must pay back their occupied funds to listed firms by the end of 2006. Then on 
June 29, 2006, the 10th Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress passed 
Amendment Six to the Criminal Law of China. Article 169 of this amendment states that 
senior executives and directors of publicly listed firms would be jailed for 3 to 7 years (in 
addition to fines), if they cause severe loss to the firm by providing company funds to other 
parties under obviously unfair conditions or with the knowledge that these funds will not be 
repaid. This unprecedented move shows that the authorities are determined to tackle the 
server problem of fund occupation by large shareholders and other insiders. We therefore 
expect that these laws and regulations would reduce the severity of tunneling through fund 
occupation.  
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 However, weak and selective enforcement of laws and regulations has long been a 
major issue in China (e.g., Pei 2001; Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis 2010). Berkman, Cole, and 
Fu (2010) examine the reaction of the market to changes in regulation designed to better 
protect minority investors and find that firms with strong ties to governments benefit little 
from these regulations, suggesting the market does not expect strong enforcement from 
regulators.  
 We therefore expect that: 
H 2: to the new laws and regulations can reduce the overall severity of tunneling through 
fund occupations. But they are less effective for SOEs and firms with politically connected 
managers. 
3.2.4 Impact of founder-managers and the political connections of founder-
managers on tunneling 
 
Founder-managers are those managers who were founders or main executives when a 
firm was first incorporated or spun-off. We will demonstrate that it’s crucial to distinguish 
founder-managers from non-founder-managers and the political connection of founder-
managers from the political connection of non-founder-managers when it comes to their 
impact on tunneling activities. First, despite the fact that the private sector has been the main 
engine of China’s economic growth over the past two decades, private firms are still being 
discriminated and disadvantaged in many areas. Governments, either central or local, still 
maintain considerable control over the allocation of resources such as land, energy, awarding 
of government projects and procurements, etc.  Bank loans, a primary source of external 
financing, flow disproportionally to SOEs despite their poor performance (Cull and Xu 
2000). Private firms often face many administrative obstacles trying to obtain licenses and 
enter certain industries. Furthermore, the quality of law and effectiveness of law enforcement 
are low and below the average of other transition economies (Pistor and Xu 2005). Private 
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firms are frequently discriminated when it comes to the enforcement of contracts with 
governments or SOEs. To overcome these imperfect market and market-supporting 
institutional hurdles, private entrepreneurs have strong motivation to enter politics or to 
establish political connection (Li, Meng, and Zhang 2006). 
Most of China’s privately controlled firms were established by entrepreneurs who are 
most likely to have the largest ownership, often assume the position of Chairman, CEO, or 
both. 8 Founder-managers often consider their firms to be personal achievement and this 
motivation encourages them to take a long-term approach, rather than short-term actions 
(Fahlenbrach 2009).9
H 3a: For private firms, manager’s founder status is negatively related to tunneling.  
 As we discussed earlier, the motivation for private entrepreneurs to 
establish political connection is mainly to overcome institutional barriers; and it’s usually 
costly to establish and maintain political connection (Shleifer and Vishny 1994). To 
maximize the returns from political connection, founders have an even stronger incentive in 
the long-term success of their firms. Furthermore, private business owners often face fierce 
competition in becoming and maintaining a delegate to the CPC or CPPCC, both of which are 
important channels for political connection. Ceteris paribus, a manager who is thought to 
have engaged in tunneling is more likely to lose delegate status (and the political connection) 
than a manager who isn’t.  Therefore, we propose that: 
H 3b: For private firms, the political connection of a founder-manager is also negatively 
related to tunneling. 
                                                          
8 Indeed, we find that, for our sample, the ownership of the largest shareholder (which is often the founder) is 
28.49% for founder-manager firms and 21.19% for non-founder-manager firms. The difference is significant at 
the 1% level. 
9 In China, the government maintains tight control and has the most influential power in deciding which firms 
can go public (Peng, Wei and Yang 2011). It’s reasonable to assume that the government would give SOEs 
preferential treatment to go public. This means the listing status is probably one of the most valuable assets of 
a privately controlled listed firm. 
19 
 
 Unlike founder-managers at private firms, founder-managers at SOEs are appointed 
by governments to head these newly established firms. In some cases they are instructed by 
the government to set up new businesses to help the local economy, or for other social issues 
such as high unemployment. To encourage them to better manage the firm, governments 
grant them a certain amount of share ownership. Indeed, our results show that the average 
equity ownership is 0.35% for a founder-manager at SOEs and 0.07% for a non-founder-
manager. This difference is significant at the 1% level. And because of the presence of 
governments as the largest shareholders and the high visibility of these founder-managers, it 
is generally difficult for a founder-manager to tunnel through fund occupation. Therefore we 
expect that: 
H 3c: For both local SOEs and central SOEs, manager’s founder status is negatively related 
to tunneling. 
 Many managers were government officials before taking up their business roles, so 
they are politically connected. They often keep their official position rankings and are often 
promoted to a higher-ranking political position if their firms perform well. Again, when 
analyzing the political connections of these founder-managers, it’s important to distinguish 
between local SOEs and central SOEs.  
 Local governments, as we discussed earlier, frequently intervene into the operations 
of local SOEs. As a result, founder-managers at local SOEs would find themselves not much 
more “powerful” than non-founder-managers, in terms of decision-making, so their political 
connection is the dominant factor in shaping their behavior. In other words, when controlling 
for political connection, a founder-manager is not much different from a non-founder-
manager, in terms of the impact on tunneling. Therefore,  
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H 3d: For local SOEs, the negative relationship between a manager’s founder status and 
tunneling becomes insignificant, after controlling for political connection. 
 In contrast, the central government usually does not directly intervene into the 
operations of central SOEs. The official position ranking and status of founder-managers 
gives them a high leverage over other executives at the firm. This could affect their behavior 
in two ways: on one hand, the incentive of political promotion encourages them to manage 
the firm well and restrain themselves and other insiders from tunneling through fund 
occupations, but on the other hand, their powerful status gives them the capacity to extract 
some private benefits from the firm. Under China’s institutional environment, we expect the 
former effect to dominate. 
H 3e: For central SOEs, the negative relationship between a manager’s founder status and 
tunneling becomes stronger, after controlling for political connection. 
4 Sample and data 
 
4.1 Sample selection 
 
 Our initial sample consists of all non-financial A-share issuing firms that are listed on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2004 to 2010. We deliberately 
choose 2004 as our beginning year because membership of the Chinese Communist Party 
was not officially open to private entrepreneurs until late 2002, when the 16th National 
Congress of the Communist Party amended its Party Constitution (Xinhua News Agency 
Nov. 18 2002). 10
                                                          
10 Although Party membership is not a prerequisite for becoming a delegate to the People’s Congress, in 
practice around 70% of all PC delegates are also Party members. 
 As we know that an applicant joins Chinese Communist Party must go 
through a formal procedure. The procedure consists of submitting an application, discussion 
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between the applicant and current leaders of a branch Chinese Communist Party, voting by 
executive members of the branch and formally accepted as a member. Normally this 
procedure may endure several a year, although there are short or longer exceptions.  Thus, we 
choose 2004 as the first year of our sample period.  
To avoid issues arising from different legal systems, we first delete firms where the 
largest ultimate shareholder is a foreign entity and firms that are cross-listed overseas 
(including Hong Kong).11
4.2 Data source and variable measurement  
 We then delete observations for the first year of listing because 
Chinese firms are commonly engaged in pre-IPO earnings management and the first year of 
listing often sees unusually high levels of various forms of related party transactions. We then 
delete observations with missing data. As a result, our final sample include 1591 firms and 
9499 firm-year observations, which is larger than most previous studies for the Chinese stock 
market. 
 
We obtain our financial data from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database, compiled by Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Company Ltd. 
CSMAR has been widely used for researches on the Chinese stock market (e.g., Bai, Liu, Lu, 
Song, and Zhang 2004; Berkman, Cole, and Fu 2010; Jian and Wong 2010). 
Generally, three approaches have been used to measure tunneling in China: related 
party transactions (Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis 2006), loan guarantees to related parties 
(Berkman, Cole, and Fu 2009) and funds occupation (i.e., inter-corporate loans in Jiang, Lee, 
and Yue 2010). We do not use the first two measurements because (1) the issuance of any 
new loan guarantee was banned by the CSRC in June 2000; and (2) the approach by Cheung, 
Rau, and Stouraitis (2006) requires an a priori subjective judgement on whether a certain 
                                                          
11 We include in our sample those firms that also issue B-shares as these firms must abide Chinese laws, 
although we exclude B-shares in our study. 
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RPT is beneficial, expropriating, or neutral to the firm. Such an approach has its limits. For 
example, Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis (2006) consider all asset sales to related parties as 
expropriating, but it’s obvious that the nature of such transactions depends on whether the 
prices paid are above, below, or the same as in arms-length deals. Therefore, we follow Jiang, 
Lee, and Yue (2010), who use the total amounts reported in “other receivables” to measure 
the level of tunneling.12 This approach is used because it’s easy to tell who the beneficiary is. 
In addition, this practice is so widespread that the CSRC has issued several rules or decrees 
aimed specifically at tackling this issue. Our measurement is narrower than that used by 
Jiang, Lee, and Yue (2010) in that it specifically includes “other receivables” by (1) the 
largest shareholder and other firms controlled by the largest shareholder; and (2) senior 
executives and their family members.13
Following Li, Meng, and Zhang (2006) and Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007), we 
consider a manager to be politically connected if he is a current or former (1) government 
official; (2) military officer; (3) member of the Chinese People’s Congress (CPC); and (4) 
member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). We hand 
collect this data by checking the “Directors and Senior Executives’ Profile” that are included 
in annual reports, and in some cases by searching the internet. 
 
Consistent with Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005, 
2009), a manager is considered to be a founder-manager if he was a founder or a main 
executive when the firm was first incorporated or when it was spun-off. Unfortunately, the 
annual reports rarely explicitly mention whether a manager is a founder. Therefore, we search 
the internet extensively through Google, Baidu, and Wikipedia. We consider a manager to be 
                                                          
12  “Other receivables” is an account item that includes receivables that are not part of ordinary business 
transactions. These receivables are essentially interest- free loans made by listed firms to other parties. 
13 The reasons why we only include these two parts of “other receivables” are: first, we are mainly interested 
in tunneling by these two groups of insiders; and second, “other receivables” by some other parties such as 
joint venture partners may be not of the nature of tunneling. 
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a founder-manager if any one of these sources explicitly mentions so and no other sources 
indicate otherwise. 
Lemon and Lins (2003) point out that “having a significant degree of control over the 
firm’s assets is a necessary condition for expropriation of minority shareholders” (p1462). So 
it’s crucial to define an effective control. In China, researchers commonly assume that the 
largest ultimate shareholder has effective control over the firm (e.g., Chen, Firth, Xin, and Xu 
2008; Wu, Wu, and Rui 2010), but this is not always the case. There are 102 observations in 
our sample where the largest ultimate shareholder has less than 10% of control rights, which 
is considered to be the lowest threshold for effective control (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer 1999).  CSRC sets 30% of total control rights as one of the criteria in defining 
effective control.14 However, CSRC also sets 30% as the threshold for a shareholder to make 
a compulsory tender offer.15
Following Lemmon and Lins (2003), we introduce a dummy variable Effective 
control dummy, to test possible different tunneling activities.
 Some shareholders would deliberately keep their control rights 
below 30% to avoid making a tender offer. Therefore, we believe that 20% is the most 
appropriate threshold for effective control in China. The cut-off of 20% of control rights is 
also used by many existing studies for Western markets (e.g., Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 
2000, Faccio and Lang 2002). 
16
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
 The definitions of other 
variables are consistent with existing literature and are reported in Table 1.  
5 Empirical results 
                                                          
14 “Notice about Issuing ‘Guides to Constitutions of Listed Companies’”, CSRC, December 16, 1997 (in Chinese, 
title is translated by the authors). 
15 “Regulatory Methods for Acquisitions of Listed Companies”, CSRC Decree No. 35, July 30, 2006 (in Chinese, 
title is translated by the authors). 
16 There is a difference in definition between the dummy variable used in Lemmon and Lins (2003) and the one 
used in our paper. Lemmon and Lins (2003) set the dummy variable to 1 if the management control rights are 
above the median and 0 if below the median. We instead use a cut-off of 20%. 
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5.1 Descriptive summary 
5.1.1 Sample distribution 
 
Table 2 reports the distribution of our sample firms by year and industry in relation to 
ownership types. 
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
 
Panel A shows that of the whole sample of 9499 firm-year observations, 3416 (or 
35.96%) firms have a private entity as the largest ultimate shareholder; 4394 (or 46.26%) 
firms have a local government and 1689 (or 17.78%) firms have the central government as 
the largest ultimate shareholder, respectively. The proportion of private firms in our sample is 
higher than that in many previous studies (e.g., Chen, Firth and Xu 2009; Peng, Wei and 
Yang 2010; Chen, Sun, Tang and Wu 2011), mainly because our sample covers a more recent 
period and private firms account for a large proportion of all newly listed firms in this period.  
Across three types of firm ownerships, local SOEs have the highest percentage of 
politically connected managers (39.24%), followed by private firms (36.50%) and central 
SOEs (24.87%). This is not surprising given the different incentives for these groups to 
establish political connection (please refer to our analysis in Section 3). On a year-by-year 
base, the percentage of politically connected managers is relatively stable, which is consistent 
with Chen, Sun, Tang, and Wu (2011) who find that the changes (establishment or loss) in 
political connection are small. This is also why we do not test how changes in political 
connection affect tunneling activities.  
As for managers’ founder status, private firms have the highest percentage of founder-
managers (33.08%), which is much larger than that of local SOEs (15.38%) and central SOEs 
(12.85%). This is not surprising given the definition of founder-manager and the nature of the 
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ownership. Noticeably, as a whole, 21.30% of all our sample firms have at least one founder-
manager, nearly double the percentage of founder-manager firms in the US at about 11% 
(Anderson and Reeb 2003; Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira 2005, 2009). This substantial 
difference clearly reflects the fact that the Chinese stock market is in its early stage of 
development. Across ownerships, the percentage of private firms with founder-manager is 
steadily rising, while the percentage of founder-manager firms in the state sector is declining 
overall. There are two possible explanations, the increasing number of newly listed private 
firms (which often have a founder-manager) and the promotion or retirement of founder-
managers at SOEs.  
Panel B reports the breakdown of our sample based on industry. The manufacturing 
industry has by far the largest number of firms, accounting for more than half of the whole 
sample. Cross-industry variations of political connection are obvious. For private firms, the 
transport industry has the highest percentage of political connection (64.71%), followed by 
agriculture and wholesale & retail trade, with both having about 42% of firms politically 
connected. For local SOEs, these three industries all show a high percentage of political 
connectedness (around 50-57%), although the social service industry has the highest 
percentage of politically connected managers. For central SOEs, the most connected 
industries are agriculture, power and gas, and transport. These different patterns clearly 
indicate that political connectedness is closely related to the type of ultimate ownership of the 
firm. For example, in the construction industry, 40.63% of private firms have politically 
connected managers, which are important for gaining access to government projects such as 
railways, highways, and other infrastructure development.  But only 22.89% of local SOEs 
and 16.33% central SOEs in the same industry have politically connected managers because 
the nature of substantial government ownership reduces the importance of political 
connection.  
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There is no particular pattern in the percentage of founder-managers across industries.  
 
5.1.2 Patterns of tunneling  
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of tunneling, measured by fund occupation 
by the largest shareholder and other insiders. Overall, 3226 firms (or 33.96%) report 
tunneling during the sample period, with average tunneling representing 2.90% of the total 
assets (or 132 million RMB). 
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
Table 3 reveals three clear patterns. First, across three types of ownerships, private 
firms have the highest level of tunneling in terms of percentage of total assets, although the 
percentage of firms reporting tunneling is the lowest. This is true either on an aggregated base 
or on a year-by-year base, except for 2008 where local SOEs have a slightly higher level of 
tunneling than private firms. Central SOEs, in contrast, have the lowest level of tunneling, 
except for 2006 and 2010, when they have slightly higher level of tunneling than local SOEs.  
Second, since 2005, the level of tunneling has been on the decline. Although there are 
some variations across ownerships, the overall pattern is clear. As a whole, tunneling 
represents 0.35% of total assets in 2010, a significant drop from the 5.30% level in 2005. This 
suggests that changes to laws and regulations have generally been effective. 
Third, despite the overall decline in the level of tunneling, the magnitude of difference 
in the level of tunneling across ownerships has also declined. For example, in 2005, the level 
of tunneling is 6.32% in private firms, 5.47% in local SOEs, and 3.33% in central SOEs, with 
a difference of 0.85% between private firms and local SOES and a difference of 2.99% 
between private firms and central SOEs. But in 2010, the difference drop to 0.14% and 
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0.03%, respectively, suggesting that the enforcement of laws and regulations has had 
different effects across firms with various ownership tyes.  
5.1.3 Variable mean analysis 
 
Table 4 presents a simple analysis of the mean comparison for variables based on 
political connectedness and founder status across three types of ownership.  
 
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
Across all ownerships, firms with founder-managers report less tunneling than firms 
with non-founder-managers. This difference is significant at the 1% level for private firms 
and local SOEs and at the 5% level for central SOEs. 
For private firms and central SOEs, those with a politically connected manager report 
less tunneling than those without such connection; while for local SOEs, firms with a 
politically connected manager report more tunneling than firms without such connection. The 
difference is significant at least at the 10% level. These statistics confirm our earlier analysis 
in the paper that ownership does matter when examining the relationship between political 
connection and tunneling.  
Table 4 also reveals that founder-managers are more likely to be politically connected 
than non-founder-managers. This is a significant difference across all three types of 
ownerships, although the reasons for the difference are not the same (please refer to our 
analysis in Section 3). It also supports our approach to investigate the interaction effect 
between manager’s political connection and founder status. 
It’s also clear that firms with a politically connected manager or founder-manager are 
likely to be largerand have a lowe financial leverage. The divergence between the largest 
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ultimate shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights is also lowe in firms with a 
politically connected manager. 
 Table 5 reports the results for Pearson’s pair-wise correlation analysis for the main 
variables used in this paper. The correlation among variables are generally weak (none of the 
correlations is larger than 0.2). More formally, we run a variance inflation factor (VIF) test 
immediately after each regression. Except for the dummy variable representing the 
manufacturing industry, 17
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
the VIF values are all below 10, indicating that multicollinearity is 
not an issue. 
5.2 Multivariate regression results 
 
5.2.1 Political connection and tunneling 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the OLS regression for the relationship between 
political connection and tunneling. We classify all firms into three types of ownership – 
private firms, local SOEs, and central SOEs – depending on the identity of the largest 
ultimate shareholder. For each type of ownership, we divide firms into two sub-groups based 
on whether or not the largest shareholder has effective control. We run a separate regression 
for both sub-groups and an additional regression for all firms with the same ownership, by 
adding a dummy variable controlling for the largest shareholder’s ability to effective control, 
and an interaction term between political connection and the effective control dummy. The 
constant term, year dummies, and industry dummies are included in the regressions but their 
coefficients are not reported in the table. The p-values reported in parentheses are based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White (1980). 
 
                                                          
17  Please be reminded that the manufacturing industry accounts for more than half of all firm-year 
observations. 
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< Insert Table 6 about here > 
 
Model (1) and Model (2) of Table 6 show that for private firms, regardless of the 
largest shareholder’s control status, manager’s political connection is negatively related to 
tunneling but the coefficient is not significant. As mentioned earlier in Section 3, this 
insignificance may be due to the opposite impact of the founder-manager’s political 
connection and non-founder-manager’s political connection. We will test it further, later in 
the paper. The coefficient of Effective control dummy in Model (3) of Table 6 is significantly 
negative. One possible explanation is that private firms where the largest shareholder has 
effective control are more likely to be founder-manager firms, and founder-manager is 
negatively related to tunneling.  
Model (4) and Model (5) show that manager’s political connection is positively 
related to tunneling at local SOEs, but the relationship is only significant for firms where the 
government has no effective control. It confirms our expectation that local governments 
appoint politically connected managers to facilitate their tunneling from local SOEs. In 
Model (6), the significantly negative coefficient of Political connection*Effective control 
dummy indicates that after the local government gains effective control of the firm, the 
importance of the manager’s political connection weakens. This is not surprising. When the 
government effectively controls the local SOE, it relies less on the politically connected 
manager to intervene into the operation and tunnel the firm through fund occupations. One 
may argue that a manager’s political connection becomes less important because the local 
government tunnels less, but this argument can easily be rejected because the coefficient of 
Effective control dummy is significantly positive, indicating that the local government tunnels 
more from the firm as it gains effective control. 
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Model (7) to Model (9) of Table 6 show that the manager’s political connection is 
negatively related to the level of tunneling at central SOEs, but this relationship is only 
significant for firms where the central government has no effective control. 
Overall, the results in Table 6 support our hypothesis 1a and 1b.  
As for the control variables, Excess control rights is positively related to tunneling in 
all models except for Model (1). But this positive relation is only significant for firms where 
the largest ultimate shareholder has effective control. This result is consistent with Lemmon 
and Lins (2003), who observe a positive relationship between cash flow leverage (calculated 
as control rights / cash flow rights) and expropriation in firms with high management group 
control. The coefficient of Firm Size is negative and significant across all three types of 
ownership. There are two possible explanations for the negative impact of firm size on 
tunneling: (1) large firms are subjected to more public scrutiny, and (2) large firms are more 
likely to be located in more developed areas, which are found to be negatively related to 
tunneling (Jiang, Lee, and Yue 2010). Leverage is significantly and positively related to 
tunneling at local SOEs and central SOEs, which is in line with our expectations. The 
primary source of debt financing in China is bank loans, which are disproportionately 
allocated to SOEs regardless of their performance (Cull and Xu 2000). Higher leverage 
indicates more government support (through state-owned banks), making an SOE less 
concerned about any negative market reaction to tunneling. The impact of Board 
independence on tunneling also depends on a firm’s ownership. Noticeably, but it has little 
impact on tunneling for local SOEs.  
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5.2.2 Different impacts of official-type and CPC/CPPCC-type political connection 
on tunneling 
 In this section, we examine the differences between two types of political connection, 
namely political connection resulted from managers’ current or former government official 
status and political connection resulted from managers’ CPC / CPPCC status, in terms of 
their impacts on tunneling. We present the results in Table 7.  
 
< Insert Table 7 about here > 
 
 The coefficient of Official is positive but insignificant in Model (1) to Model (3), 
providing weak support for our expectation that official-type political connection leads to 
more tunneling at private firms. The coefficient of CPC/CPPCC is negative and significant at 
least at the 10% level in Model (1) to Model (3). That is, CPC/CPPCC-type political 
connection is significantly negatively related to tunneling at private firms. Recall from Table 
(6), the overall political connection has negative but insignificant impact on tunneling at 
private firms. This can be explained by the positive but insignificant impact of official-type 
political connection and significantly negative impact of CPC/CPPCC-type political 
connection on tunneling at private firms.  
 The coefficient of Official is positive in Model (4) and Model (6) and is significant at 
the 5% level in Model (4) and Model (6). It confirms our expectation that government-
official-type political connection does have a significantly positive impact on tunneling at 
local SOEs. The coefficient of CPC/CPPCC in Model (4) to Model (6) has mixed signs but 
none is significant, indicating that this type of political connection has little impact on 
tunneling at local SOEs. 
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 The coefficient of Official in Model (7) to Model (9) has mixed signs but none is 
significant. The coefficient of CPC/CPPCC is negative and significant at the 1% level in 
Model (8), indicating that CPC/CPPCC-type political connection has a significantly negative 
impact on tunneling at central SOEs. Recall that from Model (6) in Table 6, the coefficient of 
the overall political connection is negative and significant at the 10% level; while both the 
coefficients of Official and CPC/CPPCC are negative but insignificant in Model (6) in Table 
7. This suggests that neither official-type nor CPC/CPPCC-type political connection only has 
a dominant impact on tunneling at central SOEs; both types of political connection contribute 
to the overall negative impact on tunneling.  
 Overall, the results in Table 7 provide support to hypotheses H 1.1a and H 1.1b and 
demonstrate the importance in distinguishing between the two types of political connections.  
 
5.2.3 Effectiveness of laws and regulations on tunneling 
As mentioned in Section 3.2, Chinese authorities have introduced some laws and 
regulations designed to tackle the severe issue of tunneling through fund occupations. To test 
the effectiveness of these changes, we divide our sample period into sub-period 1(year 2004 
to 2006) and sub-period 2 (year 2007 to 2010).18
                                                          
18 In unreported tests, we divide the whole sample period into sub-period (2004 to 2007) and sub-period (2008 
to 2010) and obtain similar results to those in Table 8. 
 We make this division for at least two 
reasons. (1) On October 19, 2005, the State Council of China issues a “Notice on improving 
the quality of listed firms” on behalf of the CSRC. CSRC It explicitly demanded that all 
funds occupied by controlling shareholders must be repaid by the end of 2006. (2) On June 
29 2006, the 10th Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress passed Amendment 
Six to the Criminal Law of China. Article 169 of this Amendment states that senior 
executives and directors of publicly listed firms would be jailed for 3 to 7 years (in addition 
to fines), if they cause severe loss to the firm by providing company funds to other parties 
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under obviously unfair conditions or with the knowledge that these funds will not be repaid. 
This was an unprecedented move because all previous regulations were issued in the name of 
CSRC, which had no prosecuting power.  
For each sub-period we run a regression for each of the three types of ownership and 
one regression for all three ownerships combined. In addition, we run a regression for the 
whole sample by adding a dummy variable Late and its interaction terms with political 
connection and ownership types. The dummy variable Late is coded 1if an observation is in 
the sub-period 2 and zero otherwise. It catches the changes in the impact of political 
connection and ownership on tunneling from sub-period 1 to sub-period 2. We report the 
results in Table 8. 
 
< Insert Table 8 about here > 
 
Model (1) and Model (5) show that for private firms, a manager’s political 
connection, as a whole, is not significantly related to tunneling in either sub-period 1 or sub-
period 2. A comparison between Model (2) and Model (6) shows that a manager’s political 
connection at local SOEs has  significantly positive impact on tunneling in sub-period 1, but 
the impact becomes insignificant in sub-period 2. In contrast, Model (3) and Model (7) show 
that a manager’s political connection at central SOEs has negative but insignificant impact on 
tunneling in sub-period 1; but the negative impact becomes significant at the 1% level in sub-
period 2. One possible explanation for the weaker positive impact at local SOEs and stronger 
negative impact at central SOEs is that the relationship between manager turnover (and 
compensation, political promotion) and firm performance has strengthened at both local and 
central SOEs, making managers more interested in improving firm performance. 
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The coefficient of Central in Model (4) is negative and significant at the 10% level, 
indicating that central SOEs have significantly less tunneling than private firms in sub-period 
1. But the coefficient of Central becomes insignificant in Model (8), indicating that the 
difference in tunneling between central SOEs and private firms has narrowed substantially, 
which is consistent with the descriptive statistics in Table 3.  
Model (9) of Table 8 is for the full sample (i.e., all firms across three types of 
ownership in the whole sample period). The coefficient of Late is negative and significant at 
the 1% level, indicating that for the full sample, the level of tunneling has dropped 
substantially from sub-period 1 to sub-period 2.  The coefficient of the interaction term 
Political connection*Late is positive and significant at the 5% level, indicating that the 
impact of political connection on tunneling is stronger in sub-period 2 than in sub-period 
1.The coefficients of both Local*Late and Central *Late are positive and significant at the 
1% level, while both the coefficients of Local and Central are negative with the latter 
significant at the 5% level. This indicates that the decline in tunneling (from sub-period 1 to 
sub-period 2) is less in local and central SOEs than in private firms, although the absolute 
level of tunneling is still lower than private firms. 
 Overall, the results in Table 8 demonstrate that while changes in laws and regulations 
have reduced the severity of tunneling across the market, they are less effective for politically 
connected firms and SOEs. These results provide strong support for hypothesis 2. 
5.2.4 Founder-manager, political connection of founder-manager and tunneling 
 
 We next examine the impact of a manager’s founder status on tunneling. Based on our 
analysis in Section 3, a certain relationship exists between the manager’s founder status and 
political connectedness. As a result we also test the interaction between founder-manager and 
political connection. The regression results are reported in Table 9. 
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< Insert Table 9 about here > 
 
 The coefficient of Founder manager is significantly negative in Model (1), Model (3) 
and Model (5). This indicates that the manager’s founder status is negatively related to 
tunneling for firms across all three types of ownership. The coefficient of Political 
connection*Founder manager in Model (2) is negative and significant at the 5% level, 
indicating that the political connection of a founder-manager is negatively related to 
tunneling in private firms. It provides support for hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c. It also indirectly 
supports our expectation that founder-managers in private firms establish political 
connections to overcome any unfavorable institutional environment, rather than to facilitate 
tunneling.   
 Both coefficients of Founder manager and Political connection*Founder manager 
are insignificant in Model (4) of Table 9, while the coefficient of Political connection is 
significantly positive. This result indicates that manager’s founder status has no significant 
impact on tunneling in local SOEs, after controlling for his political connection. This is not 
surprising given that local governments have a substantial influence on the operation of local 
SOEs and the employment of managers. Therefore, the impact of political connection would 
dominate the impact of founder status. And as we have already found, political connection is 
positively related to tunneling at local SOEs. So hypothesis 3d is supported. 
 The coefficient of Founder manager in Model (6) remains negative and becomes 
more significant than in Model (5). The coefficient of Political connection*Founder manager 
is negative and significant at the 5% level, indicating that the political connection of a 
founder-manager in central SOEs has strong negative impact on tunneling. This confirms our 
expectation that a politically connected founder-manager at central SOEs has strong 
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incentives for restraining from tunneling through fund occupation because if they are caught, 
it may well jeopardize their political future.  So hypothesis 3e is also supported. 
 
5.3 Additional tests 
 
5.3.1 Chairman’s political connection vs. CEO’s political connection 
 
 So far we have not made any distinction between the Chairman and CEO when 
discussing the impact of manager’s political connection and founder status. Existing literature 
however, has taken different approaches in determining who the top executive in Chinese 
firms is. Fan, Wong, Zhang (2007) regard the CEO as the top executive in China, whereas 
Firth, Fung, and Rui (2006) consider the Chairman as the top executive because they are 
often involved in day-to-day decision making at Chinese firms. Kato and Long (2006) also 
consider the Chairman as the CEO insofar that the Chairman is paid a salary by the firm. 
 We therefore examine whether there is any difference between a Chairman’s political 
connection and a CEO’s political connection, in terms of their impact on tunneling. The 
results are reported in Table 10. 
< Insert Table 10 about here> 
 
Model (1) and Model (2) are regressions for private firms. The coefficient of Chair 
political connection in Model (1) is negative and significant at the 10% level. The coefficient 
of CEO political connection in Model (2) is positive but insignificant. One possible 
explanation for the difference in impact between the Chairman’s and CEO’s political 
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connection is that founders of private firms are more likely to take the position of Chairman 
and their political connection is negatively related to tunneling in private firms.19
 The results for local SOEs are reported in Model (3) and Model (4). The coefficient 
of Chair political connection in Model (3) is positive and significant at the 10% level while 
the coefficient of CEO political connection in Model (4) is negative but insignificant. These 
results are not surprising. The Chairman is the legal representative of a firm and in most cases 
is directly appointed by the largest shareholder (for local SOEs, they are local governments). 
Apart from the financial performance of the firm, the Chairman is often responsible for 
carrying out government policies, maintaining social welfares, and helping out other local 
SOEs in the same region. As a result, the Chairman’s compensation (monetary or political 
promotion) is often only weakly related to firm performance at SOEs (Zhao, Yang and Bai 
2007). The role of CEO, however, is focused more on a firm’s financial performance. 
Compared to the Chairman, the CEO’s compensation is more closely related to firm 
performance (Zhao, Yang and Bai 2007). However, at the same time, CEOs at local SOEs 
also face pressure from local governments, which may explain the negative but insignificant 
relationship between CEO’s political connection and tunneling. 
 
The negative but insignificant coefficients in Model (5) and Model (6) show that for 
central SOEs, neither the Chairman’s political connection nor the CEO’s political connection 
alone substantially affects tunneling.  
 
5.3.2 Self-selection and reverse causality  
 
 We don’t believe that being a founder-manager is endogeneous to the level of 
tunneling, because tunneling does not exist until a firm is founded. 
                                                          
19 Indeed, we find that of the 1130 private firms with founder-managers, 1108 founders take the position of 
Chairman and 502 founders take the position of CEO (some founders take both positions). 
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We are, however, concerned about the possible endogeneity of the establishment of 
political connection. For example, those local SOEs with a high level of tunneling may be 
more likely to appoint politically connected managers. To address this concern, we follow 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) and run the Heckman’s treatment effect regression, using a two-
stage procedure. 
In the first stage we create a probit model to examine the probability of a firm 
appointing a political connected manager. The independent variables in the probit model 
include those variables used in the OLS regressions, as well as two additional variables. We 
include the Lagged tunneling to test the possible reverse causality between political 
connection and the level of tunneling. We also include Board size (measured as the natural 
log of the total number of board directors) to serve as the instrumental variable. There is no 
systematic evidence to suggest that board size affects firm behavior or the level of tunneling 
in China. For our sample the mean of Board size is 2.22 for firms with politically connected 
manager and 2.18 for firms without politically connected manager. This difference is 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting there may be some relationship between political 
connection and board size. Therefore, it satisfies the two conditions as an instrumental 
variable. 
In the second stage the dependent variable is the level of tunneling used in the OLS 
regressions earlier.  The estimated probability of political connection generated in the first 
stage (the “treatment effect” in Villalonga and Amit 2006) is included in the second stage as 
an independent variable. Heckman’s Lambda is also included. The results of the second-stage 
regressions are reported in Table 11. We also report in Table 11 the coefficient of Lagged 
tunneling from the first-stage regression. 
 
< Insert Table 11 about here> 
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The coefficient of Lambda is significant in all three regressions, suggesting that there 
is sample selection bias in the OLS regression. The coefficient of Lagged tunneling is not 
significant in any of the three models, indicating that reverse causality is not an issue in this 
study. The coefficients of the Treatment effect (corrected for selection bias) have the same 
sign as in the OLS regression, but the significance becomes stronger. Therefore, our previous 
results remain.  
6 Conclusion 
 
In this study we investigate the impact of manager’s political connection and founder 
status on a firm’s tunneling practice in China from 2004 to 2010. We find that such impacts 
are subject to the ownership identity of the largest ultimate shareholder of the firm and 
whether the largest shareholder has effective control. Specifically, managers’ political 
connections encourage tunneling at local SOEs firms that the state ownerships are not large 
enough for effective control, while managers’ political connections mitigate tunneling at 
central SOEs firms, but have insufficient impact on tunneling at private firms.  
Firms with funder-managers are reluctant to take tunneling, which can be observed 
across all types of ownership firms. In particular, when the political connected managers are 
also firms’ founders, the negative impact on tunneling is stronger at central SOEs firms and 
still significant  private firms, but becomes insignificant at local SOEs firms due to effect 
from the political connections.  
 
We also find that there exist distinct differences between official-type and 
CPC/CPPCC-type political connection in terms of their impacts on tunneling. The overall 
negative impact at private firms are totally driven by managers’ CPC/CPPCC-type  political 
connection, as managers’ official-type political connection is found to be positively related to 
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tunneling at private firms. For local SOEs, managers’ official-type political connection has 
the dominant positive impact on tunneling. For central SOEs, both types of political 
connections contribute to the overall negative impact on tunneling; buy neither type alone is 
significant. 
We also find that changes to laws and regulations have reduced the extreme market-
wide tunneling by firm insiders. However, the effectiveness of those changes varies across 
firms. They are least effective for firms with politically connected managers and firms with 
governments as the largest ultimate shareholders. 
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Table 1 Definition of variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Description 
Tunneling The ratio of “other receivables” by the largest shareholder and other insiders to the total assets of 
the firm 
Political connection A dummy variable that equals one if either (or both) the Chairman or the CEO is a current or 
former government official, military officer or member of the People’s Congress or the People’s 
Political Consultative Conference; zero otherwise 
Founder manager A dummy variable that equals one if a manager is a founder or a main executive when the firm 
was first incorporated (including when spun-off); zero otherwise 
Excess control rights The divergence between the largest ultimate shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights 
Board independence The percentage of board members who are independent 
Firm size The natural log of total assets of the firm 
Sales growth The percentage change of the firm’s total sales over the previous period 
Leverage The firm’s financial leverage, calculated as total debts divided by total assets 
Effective control A dummy variable that equals one if the largest ultimate shareholder has at least 20% of control 
rights of the firm; zero otherwise 
Private A dummy variable that equals one if the largest ultimate shareholder of the firm is a natural 
person or a private company; zero otherwise 
Local A dummy variable that equals one if the largest ultimate shareholder of the firm is a local 
government agency or a company controlled by a local government; zero otherwise 
Central A dummy variable that equals one if the largest ultimate shareholder of the firm is a central 
government agency or a company controlled by the central government; zero otherwise 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of manager’s political connection and founder status 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of manager’s political connection and founder status across ownerships. Panel A reports sample breakdown across years and Panel B reports 
sample breakdown across industries.  Political connection and founder-manager are defined in Table 1. Frequency is calculated by dividing the number of firms with politically connection or 
founder–manager over the total number of firms in that category. For example, there are 339 private firms in 2004 with 119 of them politically connected, therefore, the frequency of political 
connection is 119/339=35.10%. The same method applies to Panel A and Panel B. 
Panel A: Sample breakdown across years 
 
 
Year 
Private Firms  Local SOEs  Central SOEs 
 
Full Sample 
# of firms 
Politically 
connected 
(frequency) 
Founder-
manager 
(frequency) 
 # of firms 
Politically 
connected 
(frequency) 
Founder-
manager 
(frequency) 
 # of firms 
Politically 
connected 
(frequency) 
Founder-
manager 
(frequency) 
 
#  of 
firms 
Politically 
connected 
(frequency) 
Founder-
manager 
(frequency) 
2004 339 
119 
(35.10%) 
84 
(24.78%) 
 643 
254 
(39.50%) 
106 
(16.49%) 
 199 
52 
(26.13%) 
27 
(13.57%) 
 
1181 
425 
(35.99%) 
217 
(18.37%) 
2005 400 
140 
(35.00%) 
113 
(28.25%) 
 658 
256 
(38.91%) 
111 
(16.87%) 
 220 
54 
(24.55%) 
32 
(14.55%) 
 
1278 
450 
(35.21%) 
256 
(20.03%) 
2006 429 
152 
(35.43%) 
121 
(28.21%) 
 618 
241 
(39.00%) 
99 
(16.02%) 
 232 
55 
(23.71%) 
32 
(13.79%) 
 
1279 
448 
(35.03%) 
252 
(19.70%) 
2007 474 
172 
(36.29%) 
141 
(29.75%) 
 614 
244 
(39.74%) 
99 
(16.12%) 
 235 
61 
(25.96%) 
31 
(13.19%) 
 
1323 
477 
(36.05%) 
271 
(20.48%) 
2008 538 
192 
(35.69%) 
193 
(35.87%) 
 627 
252 
(40.19%) 
97 
(15.47%) 
 257 
67 
(26.07%) 
34 
(13.23%) 
 
1422 
511 
(35.94%) 
324 
(22.78%) 
2009 596 
228 
(38.26%) 
225 
(37.75%) 
 618 
241 
(39.00%) 
88 
(14.24%) 
 268 
69 
(25.75%) 
32 
(11.94%) 
 
1482 
538 
(36.30%) 
345 
(23.28%) 
2010 640 
244 
(38.13%) 
253 
(39.53%) 
 616 
236 
(38.31%) 
76 
(12.34%) 
 278 
62 
(22.30%) 
29 
(10.43%) 
 
1534 
542 
(35.33%) 
358 
(23.34%) 
Total 3416 
1247 
(36.50%) 
1130 
(33.08%) 
 4394 
1724 
(39.24%) 
676 
(15.38%) 
 1689 
420 
(24.87%) 
217 
(12.85%) 
 
9499 
3391 
(35.70%) 
2023 
(21.30%) 
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Panel B: Sample breakdown across industries 
 
 
 
Industry 
Private  Local SOEs  Central SOEs  Full sample 
# of 
firms 
Politically  
Connected 
(frequency) 
Founder 
manager 
(frequency) 
 
# of 
firms 
Politically 
connected 
(frequency) 
Founder 
manager 
(frequency) 
 
# of 
firms 
Politically 
connected 
(frequency) 
Founder 
manager 
(frequency) 
 
# of 
firms 
Politically 
connected 
(frequency) 
Founder 
manager 
(frequency) 
Agricultural, forestry, 
livestock  & fishery (A) 
90 
38 
(42.22%) 
36 
(40.00%) 
 97 
48 
(49.48%) 
36 
(37.11%) 
 27 
13 
(48.15%) 
6 
(22.22%) 
 214 
99 
(46.26%) 
78 
(36.45%) 
Mining (B) 24 
4 
(16.67%) 
2 
(8.33%) 
 119 
36 
(30.25%) 
32 
(26.89%) 
 54 
10 
(18.52%) 
8 
(14.81%) 
 197 
50 
(25.38%) 
42 
(21.32%) 
Manufacturing (C) 2025 
803 
(39.65%) 
778 
(38.42%) 
 2424 
804 
(33.17%) 
394 
(16.25%) 
 891 
181 
(20.31%) 
99 
(11.11%) 
 5340 
1788 
(33.48%) 
1271 
(23.80%) 
Power, gas and water 
production and supply (D) 
34 
11 
(32.35%) 
7 
(20.59%) 
 272 
126 
(46.32%) 
22 
(8.09%) 
 120 
47 
(39.17%) 
19 
(15.83%) 
 426 
184 
(43.19%) 
48 
(11.27%) 
Construction (E) 64 
26 
(40.63%) 
35 
(54.69%) 
 83 
19 
(22.89%) 
15 
(18.07%) 
 49 
8 
(16.33%) 
3 
(6.12%) 
 196 
53 
(27.04%) 
53 
(27.04%) 
Transport and storage (F) 34 
22 
(64.71%) 
10 
(29.41%) 
 244 
139 
(56.97%) 
39 
(15.98%) 
 64 
24 
(37.50%) 
8 
(12.50%) 
 342 
185 
(54.09%) 
57 
(16.67%) 
Information Technology 
(G) 
284 
61 
(21.48%) 
129 
(45.42%) 
 123 
33 
(26.83%) 
8 
(6.50%) 
 179 
45 
(25.14%) 
42 
(23.46%) 
 586 
139 
(23.72%) 
179 
(30.55%) 
Wholesale and retail 
trade (H) 
212 
89 
(41.98%) 
27 
(12.74%) 
 356 
202 
(56.74%) 
53 
(14.89%) 
 87 
31 
(35.63%) 
7 
(8.05%) 
 655 
322 
(49.16%) 
87 
(13.28%) 
Real estate (J) 324 
122 
(37.65%) 
34 
(10.49%) 
 300 
139 
(46.33%) 
16 
(5.33%) 
 62 
11 
(17.74%) 
7 
(11.29%) 
 686 
272 
(39.65%) 
57 
(8.31%) 
Social service (K) 97 
24 
(24.74%) 
32 
(32.99%) 
 138 
79 
(57.25%) 
28 
(20.29%) 
 57 
18 
(31.58%) 
18 
(31.58%) 
 292 
121 
(41.44%) 
78 
(26.71%) 
Communication & 
cultural industry (L) 
13 
0 
(0.00%) 
5 
(38.46%) 
 36 
19 
(52.78%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
 25 
9 
(36.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
 74 
28 
(37.84%) 
5 
(6.76%) 
Comprehensive (M) 215 
47 
(21.86%) 
35 
(16.28%) 
 202 
80 
(39.60%) 
33 
(16.34%) 
 74 
23 
(31.08%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
 491 
150 
(30.55%) 
68 
(13.85%) 
Total 3416 
1247 
(36.50%) 
1130 
(33.08%) 
 4394 
1724 
(39.24%) 
676 
(15.38%) 
 1689 
420 
(24.87%) 
217 
(12.85%) 
 9499 
3391 
(35.70%) 
2023 
(21.30%) 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of tunneling 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of tunneling across ownerships. Tunneling is defined in Table 1.  Frequency (freq.) is calculated by dividing the number of tunneling observations 
over the total number of firms in that group. For example, in 2004, there are 144 private firms that report tunneling and the total number of private firms in that year is 339 (see Table 2), 
therefore, the frequency of tunneling is 144/339=42.48%.   
 
 
 
 Private firms 
 
Local SOEs 
 
Central SOEs 
 
Full sample 
Year 
No. 
(freq.) 
Mean 
(%) 
Median 
(%) 
Std. Dev. 
(%) 
 
No. 
(freq.) 
Mean 
(%) 
Median 
(%) 
Std. Dev. 
(%) 
 
No. 
(freq.) 
Mean 
(%) 
Median 
(%) 
Std. Dev. 
(%) 
 
No. 
(freq.) 
Mean 
(%) 
Media
n 
(%) 
Std. Dev. 
(%) 
2004 
144 
(42.48%) 
5.30 0.56 9.71 
 
300 
(46.66%) 
3.78 0.51 7.55 
 
93 
(46.73%) 
2.58 0.18 6.30 
 
537 
(45.47%) 
3.98 0.40 8.04 
2005 
261 
(65.25%) 
6.32 0.72 11.16 
 
463 
(70.36%) 
5.47 0.73 10.15 
 
175 
(79.55%) 
3.33 0.62 6.37 
 
899 
(70.34%) 
5.30 0.71 9.90 
2006 
107 
(24.94%) 
4.46 0.34 10.17 
 
179 
(28.96%) 
1.67 0.09 5.00 
 
83 
(35.78%) 
1.89 0.07 6.34 
 
369 
(28.85%) 
2.53 0.11 7.24 
2007 
107 
(22.57%) 
2.57 0.09 6.91 
 
161 
(26.22%) 
1.79 0.06 6.37 
 
86 
(36.60%) 
1.20 0.03 5.08 
 
354 
(26.76%) 
1.88 0.06 6.26 
2008 
85 
(15.80%) 
1.36 0.04 4.54 
 
171 
(27.27%) 
1.50 0.06 5.69 
 
91 
(35.41%) 
0.67 0.06 2.46 
 
347 
(24.40%) 
1.25 0.06 4.75 
2009 
101 
(16.95%) 
1.35 0.02 5.48 
 
144 
(23.30%) 
0.77 0.02 3.46 
 
106 
(39.55%) 
0.39 0.03 1.30 
 
351 
(23.68%) 
0.82 0.02 3.75 
2010 
110 
(17.19%) 
0.42 0.01 1.93 
 
163 
(26.46%) 
0.28 0.02 0.85 
 
96 
(34.53%) 
0.39 0.03 1.16 
 
369 
(24.05%) 
0.35 0.02 1.33 
Total 
915 
(26.79%) 
3.79 0.14 8.85 
 
1581 
(35.98%) 
2.95 0.14 7.50 
 
730 
(43.22%) 
1.67 0.10 4.98 
 
3226 
(33.96%) 
2.90 0.13 7.48 
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Table 4 Mean comparison of variables based on manager’s political connection and founder status 
This table presents the statistics for variables across ownerships.  Also reported are difference tests results for variables between firms with / without politically connected manager and with 
/ without founder-manager. The variables are defined in Table 1. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Central SOEs  Full sample 
 
Politically 
connected 
Non-
connected 
Difference 
Founder 
manager 
Non-
founder 
manager 
Difference 
 
Politically 
connected 
Non-
connected 
Difference 
Founder 
manager 
Non-
founder 
manager 
Difference 
Tunneling .514 .793 -.279 .322 .783 -.461**  .852 1.059 -.207** .457 1.128 -.671*** 
Political Connection    .323 .238 .085**     .487 .322 .165*** 
Founder-manager .167 .116 .051**     .290 .170 .120***    
Excess control rights (%) 4.289 5.557 -1.268*** 5.617 5.186 .431  5.063 6.158 -1.095*** 5.625 5.805 -.180 
Board Independence (%) 34.736 35.498 -.762*** 35.092 35.340 -.248  35.656 35.655 .001 35.862 35.599 .263** 
Firm Size 21.945 21.645 .300*** 21.954 21.685 .269***  21.588 21.302 .286*** 21.509 21.375 .134*** 
Sales Growth (%) 23.879 23.957 .078 27.457 23.419 4.038  24.712 23.405 1.307 23.287 24.030 -.743 
Leverage .500 .526 -.026* .465 .528 -.063***  .531 .713 -.182*** .470 .696 -.226*** 
 
 
 
 Private firms  Local SOEs 
 
Politically 
connected 
Non-
connected 
Difference 
Founder 
manager 
Non-
founder 
manager 
Difference 
 
Politically 
connected 
Non-
connected 
Difference 
Founder 
manager 
Non-
founder 
manager 
Difference 
Tunneling .695 1.198 -.503*** .366 1.336 -.970***  1.294 0.943 .351** .654 1.137 -.483*** 
Political Connection    .512 .293 .219***     .499 .373 .126*** 
Founder-manager .464 .254 .210***     .195 .127 .068***    
Excess control rights (%) 8.635 9.204 -.569* 7.526 9.723 -2.197***  2.667 3.969 -1.302*** 2.451 3.642 -1.191*** 
Board Independence (%) 36.300 36.280 .020 36.341 36.261 .080  35.414 35.222 .192 35.308 35.295 .013 
Firm Size 21.325 20.788 .537*** 21.316 20.820 .496***  21.691 21.555 .136*** 21.690 21.594 .096** 
Sales Growth (%) 27.014 23.793 3.221 23.697 25.599 -1.902***  23.249 22.828 .421 21.263 23.308 -2.045 
Leverage .520 1.024 -.504*** .446 1.034 -.588***  .547 .549 -.002 .511 .555 -.044*** 
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Table 5 Pearson correlation matrix of variables 
This table reports the Pearson pair-wise correlations for the main variables. The variables are defined in Table 1. P-values are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
 significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Political connection Founder manager Excess control rights Board independence Firm size Sales growth Leverage 
Political connection 1.000       
Founder manager 
.141*** 
(0.000) 
1.000      
Excess control rights 
-.064*** 
(0.000) 
-.009 
(0.380) 
1.000     
Board independence 
-.002 
(0.871) 
.025** 
(0.015) 
-.022** 
(0.036) 
1.000    
Firm size 
.117*** 
(0.000) 
.047*** 
(0.000) 
-.018* 
(0.082) 
.010 
(0.336) 
1.000   
Sales growth 
.010 
(0.341) 
-.005 
(0.644) 
.007 
(0.487) 
.019* 
(0.059) 
.097*** 
(0.000) 
1.000  
leverage 
-.034*** 
(0.001) 
-.036*** 
(0.001) 
.011 
(0.291) 
.038*** 
(0.000) 
-.189*** 
(0.000) 
-.031*** 
(0.003) 
1.000 
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Table 6 Impact of manager’s political connection on tunneling 
This table reports the OLS regression results examining the impacts of political connection on tunneling. The dependent variable is Tunneling, measured by fund occupations by the largest 
shareholder and other insiders. All other variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980). P-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The constant term, year dummies and industry dummies are included in all regressions but not reported. 
 
Dependent variable: Tunneling 
Private firms Local SOEs Central SOEs 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
No effective 
control 
Effective 
control 
All private firms 
No effective 
control 
Effective 
control 
All local SOEs 
No effective 
control 
Effective 
control 
All central SOEs 
Political connection 
-.649 
(0.166) 
-.171 
(0.245) 
-.200 
(0.684) 
.874** 
(0.020) 
.032 
(0.838) 
1.162*** 
(0.009) 
-.349* 
(0.051) 
-.131 
(0.440) 
-.401** 
(0.046) 
Effective control dummy   
-.647* 
(0.052) 
  
.525*** 
(0.000) 
  
.152 
(0.338) 
Political connection* Effective 
control dummy 
  
.089 
(0.862) 
  
-1.125** 
(0.015) 
  
.292 
(0.279) 
Excess control rights 
-.108 
(0.831) 
.020** 
(0.020) 
.012 
(0.141) 
.029 
(0.752) 
.016** 
(0.035) 
.015** 
(0.048) 
.011 
(0.627) 
.013* 
(0.069) 
.014* 
(0.054) 
Board independence 
-.170*** 
(0.006) 
-.011 
(0.502) 
-.038* 
(0.051) 
-.011 
(0.648) 
-.002 
(0.896) 
-.003 
(0.817) 
-.003 
(0.805) 
-.031** 
(0.012) 
-.029*** 
(0.010) 
Firm size 
-.955*** 
(0.000) 
-.239*** 
(0.002) 
-.420*** 
(0.000) 
-.535*** 
(0.001) 
-.335*** 
(0.000) 
-.353*** 
(0.000) 
-.224*** 
(0.000) 
-.130* 
(0.076) 
-.203*** 
(0.005) 
Sales growth 
.000 
(0.976) 
-.003*** 
(0.008) 
-.002 
(0.147) 
.002 
(0.671) 
-.006*** 
(0.000) 
-.005*** 
(0.000) 
-.002 
(0.473) 
-.001 
(0.175) 
-.001 
(0.193) 
Leverage 
-.028 
(0.475) 
.038 
(0.409) 
.026 
(0.466) 
3.932** 
(0.040) 
1.195* 
(0.055) 
1.403** 
(0.031) 
2.888*** 
(0.000) 
1.045** 
(0.012) 
2.215*** 
(0.000) 
Year and industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 629 2783 3412 405 3989 4394 144 1544 1688 
R-squared 0.168 0.113 0.098 0.265 0.108 0.112 0.924 0.086 0.125 
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Table 7 Different impacts of two types of political connections on tunneling 
This table reports the OLS regression results examining the differences between two types of political connection, namely political connection resulted from managers’ current or former 
government official status and political connection resulted from managers’ CPC / CPPCC status, in terms of their impacts on tunneling. The dependent variable is Tunneling, measured by 
fund occupations by the largest shareholder and other insiders. Official is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a manager is a current or former government official or military officer, and zero 
otherwise. CPC/CPPCC is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a manager is a current or former member of Chinese People’s Congress (CPC) or Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC), and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980). P-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The constant term, year dummies, industry dummies and other control variables are included in all regressions, but 
their coefficients are not reported for brevity. 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Tunneling 
 Private firms   Local SOEs   Central SOEs  
Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
No effective 
control 
Effective 
control 
All private 
firms 
No effective 
control 
Effective 
control 
All local SOEs 
No effective 
control 
Effective 
control 
All central 
SOEs 
Official 
.126 
(0.863) 
.234 
(0.457) 
.719 
(0.360) 
1.009** 
(0.015) 
.219 
(0.231) 
1.381** 
(0.020) 
-.200 
(0.311) 
.051 
(0.803) 
-.205 
(0.374) 
CPC / CPPCC 
-.980* 
(0.057) 
-.291** 
(0.032) 
-.917** 
(0.027) 
.395 
(0.489) 
-.228 
(0.357) 
.468 
(0.430) 
-.291 
(0.161) 
-.650*** 
(0.000) 
-.699** 
(0.023) 
Effective control dummy   
-.658** 
(0.043) 
  
.442*** 
(0.003) 
  
.153 
(0.332) 
Official*Effective control   
-.512 
(0.537) 
  
-1.153* 
(0.060) 
  
.272 
(0.374) 
CPC/CPPCC*Effective control   
.709 
(0.106) 
  
-.700 
(0.274) 
  
.071 
(0.828) 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and  industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 629 2783 3412 405 3989 4394 144 1544 1688 
R-squared 0.174 0.114 0.100 0.265 0.108 0.113 0.923 0.087 0.127 
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Table 8 Sub-period analysis of the effectiveness of law and regulation changes  
This table reports the OLS regression results examining how effective related law and regulation changes in reducing tunneling. The whole sample period is divided into two sub-periods: 2004 
to 2006 and 2007 to 2010. The dependent variable is Tunneling, measured by fund occupations by the largest shareholder and other insiders. Late is a dummy variable that equals 1 if an 
observation falls in between year 2007 and 2010; and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980).  P-values 
are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The constant term, year dummies and industry dummies are included in all 
regressions but not reported. For brevity, only coefficients of political connection dummy, ownership dummy, sub-period dummy and their interaction terms are reported. 
 
Dependent variable: Tunneling 
Sub-period 1 (year 2004-06) Sub-period 2 (year 2007-10) Full sample 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Private firms Local SOEs Central SOEs 
Whole sub-
group 
Private firms Local SOEs Central SOEs 
Whole sub-
group 
All firms 
Political connection 
-.575 
(0.625) 
2.470** 
(0.047) 
-.595 
(0.121) 
.112 
(0.894) 
.082 
(0.845) 
.216 
(0.113) 
-.386*** 
(0.008) 
.010 
(0.918) 
-.882** 
(0.032) 
Local    
-.336 
(0.316) 
   
.129 
(0.223) 
-.552 
(0.106) 
Central    
-.668* 
(0.065) 
   
.014 
(0.879) 
-.934** 
(0.012) 
Political connection*Local    
.912* 
(0.069) 
   
-.104 
(0.453) 
1.122** 
(0.029) 
Political connection*Central    
.255 
(0.634) 
   
.033 
(0.861) 
.379 
(0.488) 
Late         
-2.463*** 
(0.000) 
Political connection*Late         
1.025** 
(0.016) 
Local*Late         
.969*** 
(0.006) 
Central*Late         
1.258*** 
(0.001) 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry only 
Obs. 1166 1919 650 3735 2246 2475 1038 5759 9494 
R-squared 0.123 0.113 0.152 0.100 0.024 0.050 0.018 0.019 0.063 
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Table 9 Impact of founder-manager and political connection of founder-manager on tunneling 
This table reports the OLS regression results examining the impacts of founder-manager and political connection of founder-manager on tunneling. The dependent variable is Tunneling, 
measured by fund occupations by the largest shareholder and other insiders. All other variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White 
(1980). P-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The constant term, year dummies and industry dummies are 
included in all regressions but not reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Tunneling 
Private firms Local SOEs Central SOEs 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Political connection  
.133 
(0.759) 
 
.900* 
(0.064) 
 
-.692*** 
(0.002) 
Founder manager 
-.665*** 
(0.000) 
-.922*** 
(0.000) 
-.471*** 
(0.002) 
-.327 
(0.165) 
-.318* 
(0.062) 
-.574*** 
(0.000) 
Political connection*Founder manager  
-.657** 
(0.019) 
 
-.401 
(0.230) 
 
-.917** 
(0.035) 
Excess control rights 
.002 
(0.812) 
.004 
(0.673) 
.017** 
(0.028) 
.015* 
(0.051) 
.012* 
(0.080) 
.013* 
(0.074) 
Board independence 
-.037* 
(0.060) 
-.037* 
(0.063) 
-.001 
(0.947) 
-.003 
(0.813) 
-.029*** 
(0.010) 
-.030*** 
(0.008) 
Firm size 
-.370*** 
(0.000) 
-.373*** 
(0.000) 
-.341*** 
(0.000) 
-.340*** 
(0.000) 
-.200*** 
(0.006) 
-.189*** 
(0.010) 
Sales growth 
-.002 
(0.105) 
-.002 
(0.116) 
-.005*** 
(0.000) 
-.005*** 
(0.000) 
-.001 
(0.206) 
-.001 
(0.219) 
Leverage 
.027 
(0.442) 
.025 
(0.468) 
1.417** 
(0.031) 
1.405** 
(0.031) 
2.187*** 
(0.000) 
2.191*** 
(0.000) 
Year and industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 3412 3412 4394 4394 1689 1689 
R-squared 0.099 0.101 0.112 0.113 0.125 0.127 
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Table 10 Difference between Chairman’s and CEO’s political connection 
This table reports the OLS regression results examining the difference between Chairman’s political connection and CEO’s 
political connection. The dependent variable is Tunneling, measured by fund occupations by the largest shareholder and 
other insiders. All other variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White 
(1980). P-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
The constant term, year dummies and industry dummies are included in all regressions but not reported. For brevity, only 
coefficients of Chairman’s and CEO’s political connection and their interaction with ownerships are reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tunneling 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Private 
firms 
Private 
firms 
Local 
SOEs 
Local 
SOEs 
Central 
SOEs 
Central 
SOEs 
Full 
sample 
Full 
sample 
Chair political connection 
-.700* 
(0.090) 
 
.836* 
(0.056) 
 
-.336 
(0.123) 
 
-.246* 
(0.097) 
 
CEO political connection  
.422 
(0.520) 
 
-.236 
(0.177) 
 
-.273 
(0.398) 
 
-.115 
(0.551) 
Chair political connection*Local       
.388* 
(0.062) 
 
Chair political connection*Central       
.220 
(0.362) 
 
CEO political connection*Local        
-.222 
(0.392) 
CEO political connection*Central        
.254 
(0.424) 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 3412 3412 4394 4394 1688 1688 9494 9494 
R-squared 0.099 0.099 0.112 0.111 0.125 0.125 0.089 0.089 
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Table 11 Heckman treatment - effects models 
This table reports the results examining the impacts of political connection on tunneling, corrected for selection bias and 
potential reverse causality using Heckman treatment effect models. The dependent variable is Tunneling, measured by 
fund occupations by the largest shareholder and other insiders. All other variables are defined in Table 1. P-values are 
reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Tunneling 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Private firms Local SOEs Central SOEs 
Treatment effect 
-39.393*** 
(0.000) 
13.920*** 
(0.001) 
-24.123*** 
(0.000) 
Lambda 
-19.449*** 
(0.001) 
-12.268* 
(0.065) 
-22.848*** 
(0.000) 
Excess control rights 
.307*** 
(0.000) 
.067*** 
(0.000) 
.037*** 
(0.008) 
Board independence 
.019 
(0.267) 
-.029* 
(0.055) 
.116*** 
(0.006) 
Firm size 
7.508*** 
(0.000) 
-.711*** 
(0.000) 
-1.022*** 
(0.000) 
Sales growth 
-.004** 
(0.014) 
-.004*** 
(0.000) 
-.000 
(0.620) 
Leverage 
-2.186*** 
(0.000) 
1.022* 
(0.094) 
3.925*** 
(0.000) 
Year and industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 2792 3658 1436 
R-squared 0.172 0.139 0.165 
Lagged tunneling (from stage-one) 
-.005 
(0.378) 
.005 
(0.251) 
.006 
(0.525) 
